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Associate Professor of Economics Chicago Booth School of Business |
Contact details:
5807 S Woodlawn Ave Chicago, IL 60637 first.last -at- ChicagoBooth dot edu |
I study market design, using theoretical tools to explore market structures and design effective market rules. My research has been recognized by the ACM SIGecom Test of Time Award and the INFORMS Frederick W. Lanchester Prize.
A significant portion of my work focuses on matching markets, such as college admissions and the NRMP medical residency match. My research includes using tractable cutoff characterizations to clarify the structure of these markets and support empirical estimation and design optimization.
I also work on cryptocurrencies, Web3, and blockchain technology. This technology allows for a new form of market design in the form of platforms whose rules are given by open-source computer code. My work explores the potential and limitations of these open systems.
I taught a PhD class on the economics of distributed systems to bridge computer science theory and economic theory. If you are interested in class materials, please email me.
Before joining Chicago Booth, I was a faculty member at Columbia Business School and spent a year as a postdoctoral researcher at Microsoft Research New England. I earned my PhD in Economics from Harvard University and hold both an MSc and BSc in Pure Mathematics from Tel Aviv University. You can find my cv here.
My PhD adviser published a highly acclaimed popular book on market design, which you can find here:
http://www.amazon.com/Who-Gets-What-Why-Matchmaking/dp/0544291131
A significant portion of my work focuses on matching markets, such as college admissions and the NRMP medical residency match. My research includes using tractable cutoff characterizations to clarify the structure of these markets and support empirical estimation and design optimization.
I also work on cryptocurrencies, Web3, and blockchain technology. This technology allows for a new form of market design in the form of platforms whose rules are given by open-source computer code. My work explores the potential and limitations of these open systems.
I taught a PhD class on the economics of distributed systems to bridge computer science theory and economic theory. If you are interested in class materials, please email me.
Before joining Chicago Booth, I was a faculty member at Columbia Business School and spent a year as a postdoctoral researcher at Microsoft Research New England. I earned my PhD in Economics from Harvard University and hold both an MSc and BSc in Pure Mathematics from Tel Aviv University. You can find my cv here.
My PhD adviser published a highly acclaimed popular book on market design, which you can find here:
http://www.amazon.com/Who-Gets-What-Why-Matchmaking/dp/0544291131
Working Papers
On the Viability of Open-Source Financial Rails: The Economic Security of Permissionless Consensus
Joint with Elaine Shi and Rafael Pass
Information Acquisition in Matching Markets: The Role of Price Discovery
(Nontechnical coverage, Supplementary Appendix - Survey of Admission Systems)
Joint with Nicole Immorlica, Irene Lo, and Brendan Lucier
Stable Matching with Peer-Dependent Preferences in Large Markets: Existence and Cutoff Characterization
Price Discovery in Waiting Lists
(slides, video)
Joint with Itai Ashlagi, Pengyu Qian, and Amin Saberi
Publications
Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting-Lists
American Economic Review, 2022
(older working paper version)
Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System
Review of Economic Studies, 2021
Selected for Highlights Beyond EC 2021
(preprint including online appendix, slides, presentation video)
Joint with Gur Huberman and Ciamac Moallemi
The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets
Games and Economic Behavior, 2021
Joint with Bary Pradelski
The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading Cycles in School Choice
Review of Economic Studies, 2021
(preprint, Supplementary Appendix)
Joint with Irene Lo
Bitcoin: An Impossibility Theorem for Proof-of-Work based Protocols
American Economic Review: Insights, 2020
Joint with Philipp Strack
Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition
Journal of Political Economy, 2017
Sigecom Test of Time Award
(Simulation Code (in C#), Figures)
Joint with Itai Ashlagi and Yash Kanoria
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets
Journal of Political Economy, 2016 (Lead article)
(Supplementary Appendix, working paper version)
Joint with Eduardo M. Azevedo
Invited Publications
Large Matching Markets
prepared for the handbook of Online and Matching-Based Market Design
Cryptocurrencies as Marketplaces
NAE’s 2019 US Frontiers of Engineering Symposium
An Economist's Perspective on the Bitcoin Payment System
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 2019
Joint with Gur Huberman and Ciamac Moallemi
On the Viability of Open-Source Financial Rails: The Economic Security of Permissionless Consensus
Joint with Elaine Shi and Rafael Pass
Information Acquisition in Matching Markets: The Role of Price Discovery
(Nontechnical coverage, Supplementary Appendix - Survey of Admission Systems)
Joint with Nicole Immorlica, Irene Lo, and Brendan Lucier
Stable Matching with Peer-Dependent Preferences in Large Markets: Existence and Cutoff Characterization
Price Discovery in Waiting Lists
(slides, video)
Joint with Itai Ashlagi, Pengyu Qian, and Amin Saberi
Publications
Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting-Lists
American Economic Review, 2022
(older working paper version)
Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System
Review of Economic Studies, 2021
Selected for Highlights Beyond EC 2021
(preprint including online appendix, slides, presentation video)
Joint with Gur Huberman and Ciamac Moallemi
The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets
Games and Economic Behavior, 2021
Joint with Bary Pradelski
The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading Cycles in School Choice
Review of Economic Studies, 2021
(preprint, Supplementary Appendix)
Joint with Irene Lo
Bitcoin: An Impossibility Theorem for Proof-of-Work based Protocols
American Economic Review: Insights, 2020
Joint with Philipp Strack
Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition
Journal of Political Economy, 2017
Sigecom Test of Time Award
(Simulation Code (in C#), Figures)
Joint with Itai Ashlagi and Yash Kanoria
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets
Journal of Political Economy, 2016 (Lead article)
(Supplementary Appendix, working paper version)
Joint with Eduardo M. Azevedo
Invited Publications
Large Matching Markets
prepared for the handbook of Online and Matching-Based Market Design
Cryptocurrencies as Marketplaces
NAE’s 2019 US Frontiers of Engineering Symposium
An Economist's Perspective on the Bitcoin Payment System
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 2019
Joint with Gur Huberman and Ciamac Moallemi
Older Papers
Universal Communication via Robust Coordination
Joint with Madhu Sudan
Lexicographic Probabilities as Similarity-Weighted Frequencies
Universal Communication via Robust Coordination
Joint with Madhu Sudan
Lexicographic Probabilities as Similarity-Weighted Frequencies
